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The Asian crisis at the end of the 20th century has brought many changes in the
Korean economy and business organizations. In this paper, we focused on corporate
acquisitions during the period 1997-2000. We draw theoretical insights from institu-
tional theory, network theory, resource dependence, and financial economics. Taking
advantage of detailed event-level data of mergers and acquisitions between 1997 and
2000, we apply hazard rate models to explain correlates of major acquisition offers. We
were able to identify substantial amount of heterogeneity in the corporate acquisitions,
and drew two major division lines for different types of acquisitions depending on who
made offers: foreign/domestic and member/non-member of business group. Model esti-
mation results show that the sets of variables affecting acquisition offers differ by the
types of acquisitions. Acquisitions by business group members depend less on the mar-
ket evaluation of target firms when compared to the acquisitions by foreign firms.
Foreign firms are more likely to follow rules of market for corporate control in making
decisions on acquisitions. These results provide partial support for the theoretical
insights we examined in this paper.
INTRODUCTION
One of the important changes that have emerged in the Korean business
scene after the Asian crisis is the rise in the number of corporate acquisi-
tions. The situation immediately following the sudden outbreak of the crisis
was one of an absolute lack of liquidity. The cash pipelines from abroad to
the chaebol through merchant banks were shut down. The Korean govern-
ment took the austerity approach following the IMF’s advice. Even if there
was some liquidity available domestically, the general atmosphere was one
of a credit crunch where everyone distrusted everyone else; the typical bad
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equilibrium in a multiple equilibria game. On the other hand, the chaebol
badly needed liquidity, in order to have liquidity supply flow again. For
example, they were required to lower the debt-to-equity ratio down to or
below 2 within about two years.
In a situation like this, receiving foreign capital investment or selling off
part of the asset was generally viewed as a strong signal toward the firm’s
recovery. However, until just a few years before the crisis, words like merg-
ers and acquisitions had been extremely alien to the Korean chaebol. The
chaebol had been able to mantain family control for decades by means of
hierarchically organized cross-shareholdings. Debt financing, rather than
reliance on the capital market, had been the key to capital mobilization. A
chaebol subsidiary becoming an acquisition target was virtually unheard of
in the Korean capital market. The legal system was also generally inclined
toward business stability by means of large shareholder protection rather
than small shareholder rights. Institutional investors, for example, were pro-
hibited by law from exercising their voting rights no matter how many
shares they held.
The sudden increase in corporate acquisitions in a market like the one
described above, especially when it is immediately after a major economic
crisis, is an intriguing phenomenon by itself. Even more significant is its
possible impact on the corporate governance in Korea. If this increased
number of acquisitions meant pulling out inefficient management and plug-
ging in a more efficient team, it could mean long overdue corporate gover-
nance reform by market forces diagnosed by many economists and the IMF.
In other words, one could argue that the market for corporate control has
finally been activated in Korea. 
We examine this phenomenon by identifying factors affecting the likeli-
hood of a chaebol subsidiary becoming an acquisition target. For this pur-
pose, 140 chaebol subsidiaries, 40 of which became acquisition targets, listed
in the Korean Stock Exchange for the period January 1997 through February
2000 are analyzed. We use event history techniques. 
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, MARKETS, AND ORGANIZATION 
THEORIES IN THE CONTEXT OF POST-CRISIS KOREA
Acquisitions and Organization Theory
In a well-functioning capital market, firms that are poorly managed by
either inefficient or opportunistic managers provide investment opportuni-
ties (Manne, 1965). Investors can take over these firms and realize capital
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gains by replacing the incumbent management with a more efficient team.
The market can also evaluate the firm’s performance reasonably well, there-
by making the market-to-book ratio of the share price a reliable signal for
these investment opportunities. A low market-to-book ratio means that this
firm is undervalued, and signals poor management. Researchers from the
financial economics perspective agree that high market-to-book ratio is neg-
atively related to becoming takeover targets (Palepu, 1986; Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny, 1988, 1989).
Ideas differ based on the organization theory viewpoint. Corporate acqui-
sitions and takeovers provide extremely interesting data in which organiza-
tion theorists can still encounter knights, raiders, poison pills, and golden para-
chutes, as if we were in one of those fantasy novels. On the other hand, we
are relatively poorly equipped with organization theories that can deal with
these interesting cases. Focusing on the relationship between organizations
and their environments, open-systems organization theories have tried to
identify the theoretical engines that distinguish organizations that can
‘adapt’ to environmental requisites and those that fail to do so and eventual-
ly ‘die’ (Davis and Stout, 1992). However, acquisitions and takeovers con-
found this way of thinking because they are neither ‘adaptations’ nor
‘deaths,’ but ‘transformations.’ In a sense, they are a way in which organiza-
tions that have failed at adaptation survive by transforming themselves
rather than dying away. Davis and Stout (1992) point out that this kind of
difficulty that organization theories have at explaining takeovers is due to
the implicit premise of accepting managerial revolution as the status quo.
Shareholders are assumed dispersed and powerless, while professional
managers of large corporations seek growth and environmental certainty,
immune from takeover threats. In the U.S., this implicit premise was effec-
tively nullified by the 1980s merger wave in which large corporations
became acquisition targets. As Herman and Lowenstein (1988) state, “the
former stability of corporate control and irrelevance of shareholder owner-
ship and voting rights to corporate power has been badly shaken and weak-
ened.”
Since the 1980s, organization theorists have made numerous attempts to
devise theoretical engines that can deal with takeovers and acquisitions. We
focus on two lines of such efforts: network theory and institutional theory.
Combining theoretical insights and empirical evidence from various related
perspectives such as ‘embeddedness’ (Granovetter, 1985), ‘resource depen-
dence’ (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), ‘inter-organizational power structure’
(Mintz and Schwartz, 1985), ‘inner circle’ of business elites (Useem, 1984),
and ‘strategic embedding’ (Burt, 1992), network theorists suggest that firms
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better located in the inter-corporate network are less susceptible to predato-
ry takeovers (Palmer et al., 1995). 
Institutional theory focuses on somewhat different factors that might
affect takeovers. To some, takeovers and acquisitions are basically diffusion
processes. Accordingly, they attempt to identify institutional settings that
allow for such diffusion processes to begin. Stearns and Allan (1996) find
that increases in the amount of capital stock that can be invested in the cor-
porate sector, and easier access to such capital by newcomer-experimenters
in the market are critical for such diffusion. In the case of the 1980s merger
wave in the U.S. market, the accumulation of Eurodollar, growth of mutual
funds, and the relaxation of antitrust laws met such conditions. Others
argue that how people view firms — the conception of control — is the key
to understanding corporate acquisitions. Takeover waves are a result of
changing conceptions of control from manufacturing to finance (Fligstein,
1990). 
Within the boundary of organization theories, debates have been ongoing
between the two camps (Palmer, Barber, and Zhou, 1995). For example,
arguing that an economic sociology must be institutional and historical,
Fligstein criticizes the network approach for ignoring: (1) important societal
institutions such as state, politics, law, and family; (2) the interplay among
these institutions; and (3) cultural frames of action of which the finance con-
ception of control is an example (Fligstein, 1995). Although we can perfectly
agree with Fligstein, we do not see any reason why network theory cannot
be integrated with institutional theory. Rather than viewing these two theo-
retical camps as contradicting each other, we interpret Fligstein’s criticism
as an advice that the meaning of networks has to be interpreted in the con-
text of the institutional as well as the competitive environment. We attempt
to contribute exactly such an endeavor in this paper. 
Post-Crisis Korea: The Institutional Context
The turnover rate in the largest Korean chaebol has traditionally been sig-
nificantly higher than their American counterparts. Of the 30 largest Korean
companies as of 1999, 77% were either not on the list or yet to be established
in 1989, while the comparable figure is about 60% among American firms
(SERI, 2000). This means that the chaebol had been more accustomed to the
survival-or-death way of doing business than were Fortune 500 companies.
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However, the bankruptcy domino immediately after the Asian crisis forced
chaebol to reconsider the viability of this familiar practice. The general lack
of liquidity and credit crunch were definitive signals that the survival-or-
death way of doing business was no longer viable. For the chaebol, selling off
part of the business group by becoming an acquisition target was one way
of refusing death.
Also, the policy changes after the Asian crisis were generally favorable for
corporate acquisitions. Those changes largely met the conditions necessary
for major takeover waves in the U.S. The Foreign Capital Inducement Law
and the Securities Exchange Law were amended in February, 1998, to allow
hostile takeovers of Korean firms by foreigners. Before this, foreigners had
been required to get permission from the Minister of Finance and Economy
in order to acquire Korean firms with assets of more than 200 billion won.
This regulation was lifted. Further, the percent of shares held by foreigners
above which needed approval of the board of directors was re-set from the
previous 10 percent to 33.3 percent. Generally, things became easier than
ever before for foreign capital to acquire Korean firms.
As in the U.S. experience, MRFTA (Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade
Act), the Korean counterpart to the U.S. antitrust law, was revised to loosen
the basket regulations on chaebol’s equity holdings. This was a significant
change because MRFTA has been the major regulatory tool for the govern-
ment to control big businesses since its second revision in 1986. The MRFTA
originally prohibited chaebol subsidiaries from holding shares of other firms
belonging to the same business group that exceeded more than 40% of the
holding firm’s assets. The original intent was to regulate chaebol’s ruthless
pursuit of growth by means of share crossholdings. After the crisis, the chae-
bol took the opportunity to loudly voice that they were experiencing diffi-
culty in complying with the government reform policy because the MRFTA
regulation did not allow reshuffling of ownership. This important regula-
tion was also lifted, though temporarily, to allow business streamlining and
other changes implied in the reform policy. The lifting of MRFTA regula-
tions resulted in a more favorable environment for takeovers, especially
when the chaebol subsidiaries were the acquirers.
Another factor that was conducive to corporate acquisitions was the phi-
losophy of the corporate restructuring program devised by the Korean gov-
ernment. After several chaotic months had passed since the outbreak of the
crisis, the Korean government officially announced its corporate sector
reform program in May 1998. According to the official account announced
by the Financial Supervisory Committee, the underlying philosophy of the
corporate restructuring program was the “London Approach.” This guide-
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line was originally formed by the Bank of England through the 1970s and
80s, and closely copied by the FSC at the end of the 20th century. This
reform philosophy is interesting, especially for economic sociologists,
because it is based on the principle of “trust,” rather than “market forces” or
“state leadership” (Chang, 2001). It was designed that way to avoid both
excessive state intervention and the market’s over-killing of viable firms
over the long-term. The Corporate Restructuring Agreement among creditor
institutions and the Financial Structure Improvement Agreement between
creditor banks and chaebol were arranged by the government to “replace the
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ in Britain until the creditor institutions accumulate
mutual trust” (FSC, 1999). Note that this trust-based philosophy and the
consequent government-mediated Agreements have some commonality in
the sense that they allow business organizations that have to die according
to the predictions of organization theory to avoid deaths. When the govern-
ment was actively mediating debtor firms and creditor institutions to avoid
corporate deaths, takeovers and acquisitions as a way of avoiding death
were not only allowed, but even encouraged.
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS IN KOREA, 1997-2000: A BROAD
DESCRIPTION
In this section we provide a brief sketch of corporate acquisitions in which
Korean firms were involved as either acquirers or targets for the period
January 1997 through March 2000. Together with the theoretical review and
the institutional context discussed in the previous section, this sketch will
lay the groundwork for the analyses in the following section. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of corporate acquisitions involving
Korean firms by month and by type for the period between January 1997
and March 2000. Excluding the small number of cases in which information
on either the acquirer or the target or both was not disclosed, the number of
corporate acquisitions involving Korean firms has been on a steep rise from
85 in 1997 to 160 in 1998 and to 247 in 1999. Entering 2000, the number sud-
denly drops. Casual observers and business presses have cited this increase
as evidence for the operation of a corporate control market in Korea.
Going back to the raw data and classifying these 492 acquisitions into sev-
eral categories, we made the following observations.1 First, in terms of the
number of acquisitions, there is some evidence that in Korea the corporate
control market has begun to operate. Second, the overall trend is deter-
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mined by Korean firms’ acquisition of Korean firms before the crisis, while
it is determined by foreign firms’ acquisition of Korean firms after the crisis.
Third, judging from the acquisition synopsis, the cases of Korean firms
acquiring other Korean firms seem to reflect either chaebol’s responsiveness
to major government economic policies such as the corporate restructuring
policy and the selection of telecommunications service providers, or the
chaebol’s need to rearrange equity ties within the business group boundary,
rather than the operation of market forces. Fourth, foreign firms’ acquisi-
tions of Korean firms demonstrate some pattern according to the year of
acquisition. The most favored targets were finance and telecommunication
companies in 1998 and on-line businesses smaller in size in 1999, reflecting
that foreigners’ acquisitions of larger Korean firms were affected by the
undervalued Korean won in the previous year.
How do we assess this general trend in terms of the operation of market
forces? The broad description we provided in this section suggests two
answers. First, although there is some evidence for the existence of a corpo-
rate control market operation, it is likely that its impact is exaggerated.
Second, acquisitions by domestic firms and by foreign firms might be work-
ing on different principles. In the following sections, we provide more spe-
cific answers by identifying characteristics affecting a firm’s vulnerability to
acquisition through event history analysis of the same data.
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The initial sample consisted of chaebol subsidiary firms that were listed on
the Korean stock market from 1997 to 2000. As our research interest lies in
whether the rising number of acquisitions had any effect on the corporate
governance of chaebol, we restricted our observations to subsidiary firms of
chaebol. Although it is possible for firms not listed on the stock market to be
acquired, we focus our attention on the functions of the capital market in
mediating the acquisitions. Our observation covers the period between 1997
and 2000. As we have already seen in Figure 1, acquisition activities were
quite active and on the rise during our chosen period. Although some
acquisitions occurred before the economic crisis, a wide and abrupt diffu-
sion of acquisitions took off only after the crisis.
Data
The data were compiled from a number of sources. The list of acquisition
offers were coded from the news releases at the time of the potential acquir-
er’s announcement of intention of acquisition. We first identified all the
acquisition offers made in our observation period and then selected cases in
which chaebol subsidiaries were the target of acquisition offers. We coded
information on who made the offers, whether the offer was successful, and
whether the acquisition offer concerned the dominant share of the target
firm or just a part of assets or a division of business. 
Based on the information of who made the offers, we distinguished
between three different types of acquisition offers. The first is the offers
made by members of the same chaebol. This type of acquisition attempt dif-
fers from other types of acquisitions in that they are more likely to reflect
the decisions of chaebol headquarters. Such acquisition offers should reflect
less of the market situations and more of the inner dynamics of organiza-
tions. The other two types of acquisition offers are made by the outsiders of
chaebol. These offers are again differentiated by the nationality of the offer-
ing firm. One of the distinct changes in the recent Korean corporate scene is
that foreign influence is rapidly increasing, reflecting the globalization of
the economy. The acquisition offers from abroad differ in characteristics
from those of domestic firms. They tend to have higher chances of success
— about 60% compared to less than 30% success of offers from domestic
firms. They also focus more on specific parts of assets — 84% of offers from
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abroad compared to less than half from domestic, rather than the dominant
share.2 Therefore we compare three distinct types of acquisition offers from
chaebol insiders, foreign outsiders and domestic outsiders.
Our measure of the dependent variable was the number of days from
January 1, 1997 until the firm became subject to an acquisition offer. Firms
that were not subject to such an offer by March 1, 2000 were considered
right-censored. We allowed the event of receiving offers as repeated events
and firms that received more than one offer during the observation periods
repeatedly entered the risk set. 
We obtained annual data on price-to-book ratios, returns on equity, free
cash flow, and the amount of capital from the internet homepage of the
Korean Information Service (http://www.kisinfo.com), which provides
detailed information on the firms listed on the Korean stock market. As
some measures of our independent variables are ratios, there are occasions
in which small denominators led to extreme outliers. We excluded such
firm-years because of outlier values. Measures are sometimes not defined
due to a negative value of the denominator, and such cases are also exclud-
ed from our final samples. This decision did not substantially affect the sta-
tistical results.
Data on the dominant ownership block of the firms came from the on-line
data analysis, retrieval, and transfer (DART) system of the Financial
Supervisory Service (FSS) of the Korean government. All the financial
reports submitted by the firms listed on the stock market are disclosed on
the homepage. We distinguished between family ownership, cross-share-
holding ownership, and diffused ownership. The first two types are the
dominant ownership patterns of chaebol in Korea. We also coded the shares
held by the dominant shareholder, and counted the number of shareholders
holding shares larger than 5% of the total. Age was calculated using infor-
mation on the year of founding from the on-line DART system of FSS.
Models
The primary statistical technique we employed was event history analysis
with time-varying explanatory variables (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 1995).
Event history models are analogous to multiple regressions in which the
dependent variable is the (unobserved) hazard rate, the rate at which events
happen. Intuitively, the notion of a hazard rate is that at any given moment
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each member of the risk set (those for whom the event in question is a possi-
bility) faces some underlying risk that the event will happen and that this
risk is related to time and to characteristics of the individuals in the risk set. 
A number of techniques have been developed to parameterize both com-
ponents of the hazard rate (Tuma and Hannan, 1984; Blossfeld and Rohwer,
1995). As our primary interest in this study lies in testing hypotheses on the
characteristics of individual firms that made them more or less susceptible
to acquisition bids rather than in any particular temporal patterns of such
offer, we can employ a semi-parametric model, commonly known as the
Cox model, based on the proportionality assumption in the following form:
h(t) = q(t) exp[αx(t)].
where h(t) is the (unobserved) hazard rate for an acquisition offer, q(t) is a
baseline hazard function, x(t) is a vector of the independent variables that
can vary over time, and α is a vector of coefficients corresponding to the
independent variables. The baseline hazard function, which is not estimat-
ed, is common across the population and can take any form as a function of
time, thus allowing estimation of the effects of the variables of interest with-
out specifying patterns of time dependence. 
As we are interested in comparing different types of acquisition offers, we
utilized Cox hazard rate models with one origin and multiple destinations.
The same sets of covariates are employed in predicting destination specific
rates at the same time. In our data, most of the independent variables vary
over time, and thus each firm’s history over the decade is divided into
annual spells from 1997 to 2000. For a firm that neither became a target of an
acquisition offer nor was deleted from our population for other reasons, the
firm’s history was considered right-censored. In estimating the event histo-
ry models, we used the Transition Data Analysis (TDA) program version
6.2, developed by Gotz Rohwer (Rohwer and Potter, 1998). 
RESULTS
Figure 2 shows the plot of the survivor function of firms receiving acqui-
sition offers. Twenty eight percent of the firms in our sample experienced at
least one acquisition offer during the thirty eight months between January
1997 and February 2000. The empirical hazard rate of receiving an acquisi-
tion offer accelerated at two points around 200 and 900 days. According to
the graph, acquisition activities proceeded at an accelerating rate after the
economic crisis at the end of 1997.3
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Figure 3 presents the distribution of timing of offers by the three different
types of acquisition offers that we identified. Among the three types of
offers, offers made by domestic outsiders came first and those from foreign
outsiders were last, with acquisition attempts by group member firms com-
ing in between. This result suggests that the time-dependence we detected
from the survivor function presented in Figure 2 could be an artifact of het-
erogeneity of events. In other words, it could be that different processes
have alternated and succeeded each other to generate the time dependence
we observed in the survivor function plot of Figure 2.
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FIGURE 2. CUMULATIVE SURVIVOR FUNCTION OF FIRMS RECEIVING ACQUISITION
OFFERS
We further investigated the relationship between the three types of acqui-
sition offers by applying a multi-destination Cox hazard rate model to our
data. Table 1 shows the results from estimation of the model. Effects of same
sets of covariates on each type of acquisition offer are simultaneously esti-
mated. 
The age effect is positive and statistically significant (p<0.05) for the haz-
ard rate of receiving acquisition offers by foreign firms. The age effect is
positive for offers from domestic outsiders, but not significant. The direction
of the age effect is reversed for acquisition attempts by group member firms,
but it is not statistically significant. Positive age dependence of receiving
acquisition offers from foreign firms support Davis and Stout’s (1992) iner-
tia argument. They pointed out that older organizations are less likely to be
agile in the face of uncertainty and transform themselves internally to avoid
the threat of acquisition. 
Free cash flow and the amount of capital both have positive effects on the
rate of receiving acquisition offers for all three types. However the effects of
capital on acquisition offers are significant only for offers by foreign and
group member firms. These results are consistent with the general notion
that firms with slack resources are more attractive targets of acquisition
offers (Cyert and March, 1963; Thompson, 1967; Jensen, 1986; Davis and
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FIGURE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF TIMING OF OFFERS BY TYPES OF ACQUISITION OFFERS




















Stout, 1992). High price to book ratio turns out to have lowering effects on
acquisition offers from foreign firms and group member firms, but these
effects are statistically not significant. However, return on equity (ROE)
does have a significant effect of lowering the chances of acquisition offers
from foreign firms. As Davis and Stout (1992: 613) state, “while market to
book provides a long-term measure of the capital markets’ evaluation of the
firm, return on equity provides a more immediate measure of corporate per-
formance.” The negative effect of price to book and return on equity on
chances of acquisition offers may imply that general rules of the capital
market are working to discipline the underperforming firms. However, the
effect of return on equity on acquisition from foreign firms alone is statisti-
cally significant. 
Consistent with earlier studies, family control tends to decrease the risk of
acquisition offers. However, the negative effect of family ownership is not
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TABLE 1. ML ESTIMATES OF MODELS OF DESTINATION-SPECIFIC HAZARD RATES OF DIF-
FERENT TYPES OF ACQUISITION OFFERS
Acquisition by Acquisition by group Acquisition by non-group 
















Number of major 0.1002 0.1646 0.0115
shareholders (>5%) (0.1425) (0.1871) (0.1860)
% Shares held by 0.0471** 0.0170 0.0523*




Number of events 25 11 14
Number of spells 427
LL of null model -493.555
Maximum of LL -210.921
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05
significant for any type of acquisition offer. Among the covariates related to
ownership structure of the firms, the percent of shares held by the dominant
shareholder has a significant positive effect on acquisition offers from firms
outside the business group. This result is somewhat confusing in that those
who are looking for takeover targets will favor firms with dispersed owner-
ship. However, it is consistent with the Korean economic situation right
after the economic crisis. As numerous firms faced shortages of liquidity,
their primary banks became major shareholders by converting their loans to
investments. Such firms would have a high percentage of shares held by the
dominant shareholder, but this does not necessarily mean that the owner-
ship is stable. These firms can be attractive as targets for take over. 
As a whole, the results imply that the three different types of acquisition
offers are affected by different sets of covariates and comprise distinct
processes of changes in corporate control. As the three different types of
acquisition offers coincide with different timings of acquisitions as is shown
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TABLE 2. ML ESTIMATES OF MODELS OF HAZARD RATES OF SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUC-
CESSFUL ACQUISITION OFFERS
















Number of major -0.0516 0.1597







Number of events 21 29
Number of spells 427
LL of null model -475.764
Maximum of LL -214.007
*p < 0.1
in Figure 3, institutional or policy changes at these different timings might
have induced the differences among the three types of acquisition offers.
However, it is impossible to disentangle these institutional or policy effects
from other effects in this study. 
Table 2 presents results from estimating hazard rate models for successful
and unsuccessful acquisition offers. Overall patterns of covariates’ effects do
not differ very much between successful and unsuccessful acquisition
offers. However statistical significance of effects differs between successful
and unsuccessful offers of acquisitions. The amount of capital tends to
increase the risk of acquisition offers regardless of whether or not they are
successful. While the negative effect of return on equity is significant for
unsuccessful bids, the relative shares held by dominant shareholders have
significant positive effects on successful bids of acquisition. The significant
effect of dominant shareholders implies that the success of acquisitions
depends on the coordination action of dominant shareholders, who are
mostly major financial institutions.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The Asian crisis at the end of the 20th century has resulted in many
changes in the Korean economy and business organizations. Of such
changes, we focused on corporate acquisitions during the period 1997-2000.
Acquisitions, especially chaebol subsidiaries becoming the targets, had been
extremely rare before the crisis. Therefore, the sudden and steep rise in the
number of acquisitions in the Korean market is in itself an intriguing phe-
nomenon. Also, compared to the financial economics perspective, which
views acquisitions as the market’s sanctioning of inefficient management,
these acquisitions occupy an interesting position in the context of organiza-
tion theories, which are accustomed to classifying organizations into those
that adapt and those that fail. Further, within the boundary of organization
theories, there has been some debate between network and institutional
approaches.
Thus, the increasing number of corporate acquisitions involving Korean
firms after the Asian crisis suggests a few interesting research questions.
First, does this trend signal the beginning of the operation of market forces
in the Korean capital market, thus implying corporate governance by the
market? Second, what was the institutional context in which such a rise in
the number of corporate acquisitions could occur? Third, what are the char-
acteristics of the firms that become exposed to acquisition attempts? Fourth,
can we find any patterns in this first ever ‘wave’ of corporate acquisitions in
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Korea? For example, do firms acquired by foreign firms have different char-
acteristics from those acquired by domestic firms? Does ownership concen-
tration have any effect on a firm’s susceptibility to acquisition attempts? We
attempted to answer these questions by analyzing the firm-level data on
acquisitions, including members of business groups. 
We were able to identify a substantial amount of heterogeneity in the cor-
porate acquisitions. We drew two major division lines for different types of
acquisitions depending on who made offers: foreign/domestic and mem-
ber/non-member of business group. Corporate acquisitions initiated by a
member of the same business group would better be taken as a case of
group restructuring or strategic adaptation of business groups. Although
they may count as acquisitions at an individual firm level, they comprise
rearrangement and relocation of resources within certain boundaries at a
higher level of the business group. Acquisitions initiated by firms outside
the business group should be more true to the meaning of market for corpo-
rate control. 
We found that these two types of acquisitions not only are temporally dis-
tinct, but also are affected by different sets of variables. Acquisitions by
business group members preceded those by foreign firms, and depend less
on the market evaluation of target firms when compared to the acquisitions
by foreign firms. When we compared the two types of acquisitions initiated
by firms outside business groups, we found that foreign firms are more like-
ly to follow rules of a market for corporate control in making decisions on
acquisitions. However, foreign firms are not yet fully active in constructing
a market for corporate control in Korea. They seem to be more interested in
acquiring parts of assets from chaebol subsidiaries at a bargain rather than in
pursuing investment opportunities for undervalued firms. 
Going back to the first question, “Does this trend signal the activation of a
corporate control market in Korea?” The evidence from our analysis gives
the following answer. Although the activation of a corporate control market
argument is partially true, acquisitions by chaebol firms are better explained
as restructuring within the business group or rearrangement of equity ties.
Those by foreign firms seem to reflect market forces, but only partially.
Price-to-book ratio, or the capital market valuation of the incumbent man-
agement, tells little about the vulnerability. However, return on equity, basi-
cally a real sector performance index, has a significant impact on this vul-
nerability. This result suggests that even when foreign firms consider a
Korean firm as a potential target, they are viewing it not in terms of ‘finance
conception’ but in terms of bargain opportunity.
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